Mercer Law Review
Volume 49
Number 4 Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 15

7-1998

Apportioning Coverage Responsibility of Consecutive Insurers
When the Actual Occurrence of Injury Cannot be Ascertained:
Who Has to Contribute in a Settlement?
Rob S. Register

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Register, Rob S. (1998) "Apportioning Coverage Responsibility of Consecutive Insurers When the Actual
Occurrence of Injury Cannot be Ascertained: Who Has to Contribute in a Settlement?," Mercer Law Review:
Vol. 49 : No. 4 , Article 15.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol49/iss4/15

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

COMMENT

Apportioning Coverage Responsibility of
Consecutive Insurers When the Actual
Occurrence of Injury Cannot be Ascertained:
Who Has to Contribute in a Settlement?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Injuries cannot always be traced to a specific point of causation.
Sometimes injuries are discovered after years of exposure to conditions
In those circumstances the term
precipitating the actual damage.
"continuous injury" is used. ' If a lawsuit is brought, it is common for
the liable party to discover that insurance policies covering the years of
exposure were provided by more than one insurance company.2 In some

1. "Continuous" injuries often arise in asbestos disease litigation, environment damage,
and toxic torts. These injuries can also be found in many negligence and intentional tort
cases. Dow Chemical Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich. 1989);
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (Canadian Universal Ins. Co.), 25 Cal. App. 4th
902, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Cal. App. 2 Dist., June 8, 1994); Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.
v. American Centennial Ins. Co., 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 183,660 N.E.2d 770 (Ohio Com. P., Feb.
22, 1995).
2. For the purposes of this comment, the primary type of insurance policy to be
discussed is the Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL") policy.
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cases, it is impossible to determine when the injury occurred or when the
injury-causing conditions existed. This leads to questions regarding the
responsibility for coverage among the liability insurers.'
Often a
settlement is entered into and paid with the knowledge that the
decisions regarding apportionment of liability and indemnification from
other responsible insurers will be left to a court.
An initial review of the case law in this area may lead to the false
perception of inconsistency among the courts. However, it is important
to note that minor variations in the facts lead to entirely different
apportionment standards. Let us not forget that determining the
appropriate method of apportionment is ultimately a matter of contract
interpretation. 4 The courts are required to apply the wording of the
policy language to the facts surrounding each injury. Also, the courts
usually decide these cases in a manner that will provide the maximum
coverage for the insured.'
The settlement of a continuous injury claim presents even more
problems in this complex area of litigation. Usually, as a result of the
settlement, the court is left to make an apportionment decision without
the benefit of a trial court's fact finding. This leaves the parties with an
imprecise determination of the actual occurrence of the injury Most of
the court decisions that address a settlement situation may not deal with
all of the issues that are actually present when an attorney is confronted
with indemnification among the liable insurers.7 Consequently, when
involved in these matters, the parties should look to case law from other
states and circuits to construct a complete argument to the court. This
comment addresses the diverse issues involved in determining the
appropriate apportionment of and indemnification for the settlement
amount among contributing insurers, including: triggers of coverage,

3.

It is a common practice for businesses to change insurance carriers over time. Many

factors may influence a change including better rates or more coverage.
4. Gelman Sciences, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 572 N.W.2d 617, 622 (Mich.
1998).

5. For the purposes of this comment, the discussion of apportionment will center
around a factual scenario in which the exact moment of injury causation cannot be
determined.

Furthermore, this scenario will rely on an assumption that the plaintiff

cannot apportion the damage during each policy period through any direct link to an actual
moment of causation.
6. Though not always mentioned in the opinions, courts tend to favor the insured based
upon the assumption that because premiums were paid to cover such losses in the
preceding years, the litigation should concern indemnification among the insurers thereby

avoiding additional costs to the insured.
7. Every "continuous injury" claim involves a unique injury causation factor. The
ability or lack thereof to determine when the causation occurred plays a crucial role in
determining the liability of the insurers.
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how to apportion liability for the settlement amount, contribution, and
subrogation. This comment also analyzes the cases in which a court
focused on the determination of amounts owed by consecutive insurers
to an insured in the settlement of a case involving injuries that span
several policy periods.
II.

WHICH INSURANCE POLICIES ARE "TRIGGERED"

Prior to 1966, a standard Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL")
policy covered liability for bodily injury and property damage that was
"caused by accident."' The courts interpreting the provision considered
this language to be ambiguous.' As a result, insurers redrafted their
policies changing the language to cover liability for injuries resulting
from an "occurrence." 0 The theory behind this change of policy terms
arose because of three ambiguities that the courts found in the term
"accident."" First, there were contradicting opinions regarding the
proper perspective to be chosen in deciding whether an act was
accidental or intended." The insurers believed the victim's perspective
should be the pivotal point while some courts ruled otherwise. 3
Second, there were ambiguities about the understood definition of
accident.' Insurers concluded that the historical meaning of accident
was "a sudden and unexpected event that is identifiable in time and
place," but some courts had already ruled that an injury resulting from
a gradual exposure to conditions was also an accident' 5 Third, there
was an ambiguity about when an accident actually happened. 6 The
majority opinion shared by courts and insurers alike was that an

8. Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and InsuranceLaw: Why Insurance
ContractsShould not be ConstruedAgainst the Drafter,30 GA. L. REV. 171, 208 n.95 (199596) (citing Roland J. Wendorff, The New Standard Comprehensive General Liability

Insurance Policy, 1966 A.B.A. SEC. INS., NEG. & COMPENSATION L. PROC. 250, 252).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (citing Wendorff, supra note 8).
12. Id. at 208.
13. Id. at 208-09 (citing Knight v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 118 So. 2d 700 (La. Ct. App.
1960)). To remedy this problem and clarify the policy, the insurers added language stating
that an occurrence had to be "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured." Id. (citing Wendorff, supra note 8). This addition resulted in the inclusion of

continuous injuries under the coverage of the standard CGL policy.
14. Id. at 209.
15. Id. (citing Beryllium Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 223 F.2d 71 (3d Cir.

1955)). The insurers again extinguished this ambiguity by adding language to explicitly
cover injurious exposure to conditions in the definition of "occurrence."

Wendorff, supra note 8).
16. Id. at 209.

Id. (citing
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accident occurred when an injury took place; however, some courts held
that an accident occurred when the negligent act was taken.17
The language of CGL policies written after this change use the key
word "occurrence" that was defined as "an accident, including injurious
exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily
injury or property damage neither expected nor intended.""8
As
history has shown, this change did little more than shift the ambiguity
to the new words. In reality the only significant difference is that the
policies now include a term that requires expertise to discern.'9 These
policies do not, and probably for a specific reason, include a precise
definition of what triggers the coverage liability." As a result, courts
have been forced to decide on an appropriate method to determine
exactly what constitutes an occurrence. As expected, the decisions are
varied and conflicting. Four main theories have emerged: (1) the
exposure trigger; (2) the manifestation trigger, (3) the injury in fact
trigger, and (4) the continuous trigger.21 Note that the use of the word
"trigger" is a judicially created term meant to incorporate the event or
events that instigate coverage responsibility under a particular policy.
The exposure trigger defines an "occurrence" at the earliest possible
time, usually when the exposure to injury causing conditions first
occurs. 2 This theory arose from asbestos litigation.'I Recently it has
gained support in the areas of toxic torts and environmental litigation. 2' These types of cases often trigger concurrent insurance policies
that are liable for one continuous or progressive injury.25 Under this
theory, if there are multiple exposures to the injury-causing conditions
then the CGL coverage liability is triggered every time the exposure
17. Id. at 257 (citing Kendrick v. Mason, 99 So. 2d 108 (La. 1958)). The insurer
included language in the new policy to specifically indicate that the bodily injury or
damage must result during the policy period. Id. (citing Wendorff, supra note 8).
18. Id. at 257 (citing SPENCER L. KIMBALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW

335 (1992)).
19. Rappaport, supra note 8, at 208. 'Thus, to eliminate the ambiguities, insurers
lengthened the contract and changed its focus from a concept that ordinary people
comprehend (accident) to a technical term that requires expertise to understand

(occurrence)." Id.
20. Apparently, vagueness in the insurance policy language allows room for
argumentative interpretation when the possibility of coverage is speculative.

21. Gelman Sciences, 572 N.W.2d at 621.
22. Id.
23. Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other Insurance," Multiple
Insurance,and Self Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1429 (1995). See also Insurance Co.

of North Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212 (1980).
24.

Richmond, supra note 23, at 1439.

25. The reason being that responsibility and liability emanate from the victim's
exposure to the conditions precipitating the injury.
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occurs no matter how many policy periods are included.2 6 This trigger
disregards the actual moment of injury because many times that
moment cannot be discovered or proven precisely.
The manifestation trigger defines an "occurrence" at the latest possible
time, according to when the injury is discovered. The event giving rise
to liability is considered to occur when the injury manifests itself in an
ascertainable form no matter how or why it occurred. Under this theory,
if the injury has been discovered, or should have reasonably been
discovered during a policy period, then that specific policy is triggered.27 This method of determining responsibility for the coverage
results in the most narrow determination of liability because once the
are liable. 2 The policy triggered
trigger is invoked no other policies
29
entirety.
its
in
loss
bears the
The injury in fact trigger is also known as the actual injury trigger.
This theory requires a finding of actual injury during the exposure to the
conditions causing the injury. This is different from the manifestation
trigger in that coverage liability can be found even if the injury is not
discoverable during the policy period. If the injury can be traced to
prior events, this theory limits the liability to the policy covering the
coverage period or periods in which the events occurred."1 If the
circumstances allow for identification of the injury causing event, this
theory reflects an interpretation of the policy's plain language and
supports the reasonable expectations of the parties.32
The continuous trigger, also known as the triple trigger or multiple
trigger, requires evaluation of the injury from exposure to manifestation.
This theory affords the broadest coverage by deeming liable all policies
that covered the periods from the initial event through discovery of the
injury.3 The rationale is that the injury may have occurred at any
number of points during the coverage periods.3 4 In cases of injuries
where the causation cannot easily be pinpointed, this method offers the
most common sense analysis. Also, the competing interests of the
insured and insurer are accommodated best under this trigger."B

26. This is the case in most continuous injuries.
27.

Richmond, supra note 23.

28. Id. at 1431-32.
29. Id. at 1432. Obviously this theory is more applicable to situations with injuries
that are readily apparent or obvious.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd. v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd., 875 P.2d 894 (Haw. 1994).
33. Richmond, supra note 23, at 1432.
34.

Gelman Sciences, 572 N.W.2d at 621.

35. Richmond, supra note 23.
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In evaluating the varied theories of when policies are triggered, it is
important to remember that though needed to categorize the opinions of
courts, the usefulness of trigger theories can be deceptive."6
In reality, reference to trigger theories is more useful in describing
what has been decided than in determining what the decision should
be in a given case. The Court can discern no consistent pattern in the
myriad trigger cases that prescribes the specific trigger theory to apply
in a specific type of case. Furthermore, reference to trigger theories
can be deceiving. Comparison of the manifestation theory with the
injury in fact theory is absolutely meaningless unless there is some
real possibility of a substantial time lag between the actual injury and
the resulting manifestation. Similarly, comparison of the injury in fact
theory with the exposure theory means nothing unless the advocate of
the exposure theory presses for a ruling that coverage was triggered
prior to the point when injury in fact occurred. Moreover, in all of
these scenarios, "real" or "actual" injury must be defined in temporal
relation to initial exposure or ultimate manifestation. Any effort to
logically organize all of the trigger cases along these lines would be
perforce ineffectual. Consequently, trigger rulings are most appropriately derived by reference to the operative policy language, as opposed
to the judicial gloss placed upon similar language in ostensibly
analogous cases."7

To underscore the problems associated with reliance upon a particular
trigger theory, it becomes apparent upon review of the case law that
some courts categorically apply a theory without an in depth evaluation

of the factual basis upon which each trigger turns."8 The rules of
contract interpretation dictate that courts interpret insurance policies in
favor of the nondrafting party to the extent that defense obligations of
CGL policies are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.39
A court must also apply the "reasonable expectations" doctrine, which
provides that "a policyholder's reasonable expectations regarding the
nature, scope and terms of his coverage should be honored by the courts
even though a careful review of the policy language reveals a particular
limitation or exclusion.' 4

36. Gelman Sciences, 572 N.W.2d at 622.

37. Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, 479 (1989).
38. Gelman Sciences, 572 N.W.2d at 622. Furthermore, the over emphasis of the
trigger theory lends to a lack of consideration for the policy language involved.
39. See 13 J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 312-13
(Walter F. Berdal ed., 1979).
40.

BARRY

R.

OSTRAGER

DspuTEs § 8.03 (1994).

& THOMAS R. NEWMAN,

HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE

COVERAGE RESPONSIBILITY
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For the purposes of this comment, it is assumed that the actual
moment of injury cannot be pinpointed when settlement is reached. For
that reason, the continuous injury trigger will apply and the main issue
becomes how to apportion the liability for the settlement amount
between all triggered CGL policy providers. This dilemma has been
addressed by many courts under all triggers of coverage, yet no solid
precedent has been formed upon which courts may rely upon today.
III.

How LLABILITY IS APPORTIONED AFTER SErrLEMENT

If the proportionate liability among the insurers is not agreed upon
when a continuous injury claim is settled, the insurance companies will
seek a court order to determine the appropriate apportionment of the
amount owed by each insurer. This may include claims for contribution
through indemnification from any insurer whose policies were triggered
but did not participate in the settlement. The court will first determine
the triggered policies as discussed before. Thereafter, the court must
choose a method to apportion the liability among the liable insurers.
The method chosen by the court will determine the amount of the
prorated portion owed by each insurer. This proration should ideally
lead to an equitable distribution of the aggregate settlement payment.
Any insurer who paid more than its share will be reimbursed and those
insurers not paying originally will be ordered to contribute.
The primary factor in requiring the equitable distribution of the
settlement payment stems from the doctrine of joint and several
liability." Courts are split on whether the liable insurers should be
allowed to sever their liability from that of the other insurer. The
reason for this desired separation is obvious: if all triggered insurers are
jointly and severally liable the court could require the insurers to pay
any portion of the settlement not recoverable from another liable insurer
thereby maximizing coverage for the insured.
In Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,42 the court was
confronted with determining the extent to which many different policies
covered liability for asbestos related diseases.4' The court found that
the terms of the policies did not lead to a resolution of the coverage
issues." The court sought to interpret the contracts "in a manner that
is equitable and administratively feasible and that is consistent with

41. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 437, 650 A.2d 974 (1994).

42. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
43. 1d. at 1038. Keene Corporation was named as a codefendant in over six thousand
lawsuits alleging injury from prolonged exposure to asbestos products. Id.

44. Id. at 1041. The insurers did not develop policy language that directly addressed
the liability issue. Id
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insurance principles, insurance law, and the terms of the contracts
themselves." 4 The controlling principle for the court's holding was the
reasonable expectation of the company when it purchased the insurance
policies." The court interpreted injury to include any part of the
process by which the injury developed and held that all the policies in
place from exposure to manifestation were triggered. 4'7
Based upon its own definition of injury, the court in Keene found that
only part of the injury would have developed in any single policy, and
the rest of the development could have occurred in any other policy
period.' This finding, as well as the court's continued reliance on the'
contract terms and expectations of the insured, led to the conclusion that
the insurers were all fully liable for the claims.4 9
The holding in Keene is one of the earliest signs that courts will use
a method of apportionment that delivers a favorable result to an insured.
In that regard, the apportionment theories are reduced to mere labels for
the desired need to maximize insurance coverage." Today, the jointly
liable approach to apportionment has met much resistance.6 1 In
another asbestos case, Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty Eight
Insulations,Inc.,2 the court allowed severable liability. ThoughForty
Eight Insulations has its critics as well,5" the most recent trend has
been for courts to follow its lead, especially in the application of the
method chosen by that court in apportioning liability.
The court in Forty Eight Insulationsupheld the district court's method
of apportioning the costs between all triggered insurers and held that
each insurer is liable for its prorata share. 54 The court used the same
contract interpretation principles as those used by the court in Keene55

45. Id.
46. Id. at 1042 (citing Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rightsat Variancewith PolicyProvisions,

83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970)). The court noted that Professor (now Judge) Keeton
argued that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion. Id. at 1042 n.12.
47. Id. at 1047.
48. Id.
49. Id. The court did note that each policy was subject to the "other insurance" clauses,
a topic which is outside the scope of this comment.
50. Some courts have disagreed with the decision in Keene, primarily because the
injuries were more readily ascertainable and the causation more readily attributable to
specific time periods.
51. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 523 N.W.2d 657
(Minn. 1994); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992).
52. 633 F.2d 1212 (1980).
53. See Montrose Chem. Corp. of California v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 F.2d 1 (Cal. 1995);
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 118 III. 2d 23 (Ill. 1989).
54. 633 F.2d at 1225.
55. Id. at 1216-18.
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and sought to resolve doubts in favor of the insured.56 The medical
evidence presented to the court showed that each exposure to inhalation
of asbestos fibers causes some damage." The negligent act was the
failure by the company to warn its employees of the danger presented by
breathing these fibers." The court noted that a reasonable means of
apportionment was available and prorated liability among all the
insurers based upon the time that they were "on the risk" while the
injured employees were breathing asbestos fibers.59 The court also
stated that the burden of disclaiming coverage would be on the insurer
for any year in question that it believed no exposure occurred.'
The apportionment method used by the court in Forty Eight Insulations is commonly referred to as the "time on the risk" method."' In the
settlement of continuous injury cases, where the causation of injuries
cannot be placed in definite policy periods, the "time on the risk" method
seems to be the tool of choice for apportioning responsibility for a
settlement payment. This is evidenced by the case of Northern States
Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co."2 In that case, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota was confronted with the question of how to allocate
damages between multiple insurance companies found liable for
environmental clean-up costs.63 The insured had previously settled
with all insurers except the defendant insurer." Because of the
scientific complexity of the issues involved, the length of time over which
damages may have occurred, and the number of parties involved, the
court chose to use a "pro rata by time on the risk" method of apportion-

56. Id. at 1222.
57. Id. at 1218.
58. Id. at 1219.
59. Id. at 1224. For example, if insurer A provided three years of coverage, insurer B
provided three years of coverage, and insurer C provided three years of coverage, and the
total time of exposure was nine years, the apportionment would be one-third for each

respective insurer. Id.
60. Id. at 1225. If an insurer could show that no exposure occurred or an employee
used an effective respirator during a year of coverage, then that insurer would not be liable
for coverage for that period. See id. at 1225 n.27.
61. See Michael G. Doherty, Allocating ProgressiveInjury LiabilityAmong Successive
Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (1997); see also David 0. Larson et al., Review
of Recent Developments in Excess, Surplus Lines, and Reinsurance Law, 32 TORT & INS.
L.J. 359 (1997); Garrett G. Gillespie, The Allocation of Coverage Responsibility Among
Multiple Triggered Commercial General Liability Policiesin Environmental Cases: Life
After Owens-Illinois, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 525 (1996).
62. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
63. Id. at 658.
64. Id. at 659.
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ing the damages.65 This decision resulted in a finding of the proportionate amount owed by the one delinquent insurer, to the other insurers
who had already paid.
The analysis used by the court in Northern States is logical and
realistic. The court concluded that even though it would have been
scientifically possible to prove the amount of harm occurring during each
policy period, it was nonetheless far too expensive to warrant such proof
in that case."
With an eye towards future litigation, the court
reasoned that to require such an investigation would reduce the
likelihood of settlement and, as a public policy matter, the insured would
be faced with extreme difficulty as a general matter if it had to prove the
damages for each policy period. 7 The court held that damages were to
be evenly distributed among each insurer proportionate to the number
of years it was on the risk relative to the total number of years of
coverage triggered.'
Missouri adopted the time on the risk method in ContinentalCasualty
Co. v. Medical Protective Co.,69 where three successive dental malpractice insurers sought a declaratory judgment regarding the proper
apportionment of a ninety-thousand dollar settlement for the repeated
acts of negligence by the insured dentist over the course of twenty
years.70 The suit alleged professional malpractice by way of the

65. Id. at 663. The court noted that liability would normally be limited to the policy
periods in which damages occurred or "as proven," however, here, that method would not
be practical. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing William R. Hickman & Mary R. DeYoung, Allocation ofEnvironmental
Cleanup Liability Between Successive Insurers, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 291 (1990)).
68. Id. The court provided the following example:
[f contamination occurred over a period often years, one-tenth the of the damage
would be allocable to the period of time that a policy in force for [one] year was on
the risk and [three-tenths] the of the damage would be allocable to the period of
time a three-year policy was in force. The amount so determined does not,
however, necessarily represent the amount of the insurer's liability with respect
to that policy.
Id. at 664.
69. 859 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. App. 1993).
70. Id at 790. All three insurers issued policies during the course of the dentist's
treatment of plaintiff. Their coverage never overlapped. Continental Casualty Company
insured the dentist for two periods. Each policy had an annual liability limit of one million
dollars for a two million dollar total. Federal Insurance Company insured the dentist for
three periods. All three policies had annual liability limits of one million dollars for a three
million dollar total. Medical Protective Company issued annual policies beginning in 1965
and ending in 1981. The liability limits of Medical Protective's policies varied from a ten
thousand dollars to two hundred thousand dollars per policy, aggregating to one million
dollars. Id.
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dentist's failure to exercise ordinary skill and care throughout the course
of plaintiff's treatment.7 One insurer, Continental, defended the suit
and eventually settled with plaintiff.72 Continental incurred defense
costs of $11,237. The trial court, focusing on the "other insurance"
clauses73 in the insurance policies, ordered a pro rata apportionment of
the loss based on the total policy limit exposure of each insurer.74 The
Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the coverage liability
should be allocated among the three successive insurers based upon the
proportionate exposure period of each insurer's coverage.75
The court in Continentalbegan its analysis of the apportionment issue
by looking to the wording of the policies involved. 76 The court recognized a distinction in the provisions of liability insurance policies
pertaining to "other insurance" coverage for the same loss. 77 The court
stated that these provisions contained "other insurance" clauses that
related only to concurrent insurance coverage of a single occurrence.78
The court found that these provisions have no application to a loss that
results from a series of occurrences with consecutive insurance policy
coverage. 7' The court also found that the wording of the documents
obligated each insurance company to pay on behalf of the dentist all
damages for which he would become liable as a result of professional
services rendered during the term of each policy.8" The court reasoned
that the policy did not purport to establish liability on the part of the
insurers for damages that occurred before or after the designated
coverage, as the lower court's order had forced the companies to do. 8'
In devising a proper allocation of liability for the settlement among
the three insurers, the court noted that each of the policies provided
coverage for specified periods of time and that these terms of coverage
constitute the policy language that supports a per diem theory of

71. Id. at 790-91. Plaintiff alleged that the dentist failed to properly diagnose and treat
her condition. Id. at 791.
72. Id.
73. An "other insurance" clause limits the liability of the insuring policy in the event
of other or additional liability insurance coverage of a loss.
74. Id. The court found Continental liable for two-sixths of the settlement, Federal
liable for three-sixths of the settlement, and Medical Protective liable for one-sixth of the
settlement. IU at 790.
75. Id. at 792-93.
76. Id. at 791.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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allocating liability between successive insurers. 2 The court clarified
this method from the method that would be used when a single loss
results from conduct that is simultaneously insured by two or more
companies.8 3 In that situation, the court stated that the application of
the "other insurance" proration clauses is logical.'" However, the court
held that where a single loss results from conduct successively insured
by more than one insurer, the method of proration based upon policy
limits becomes "illogical and patently artificial." 5 The reason for this
is that both the risk taken by an insurer and the premium received are
more accurately reflected by the amount of time of exposure to the risk
than to the amount of coverage.86
Acknowledging the fact that insurance premiums are primarily
determined by the time period of minimum coverage, the court found
that the proper basis of allocation is the length of exposure to liability
by the insurer.8 7 Using this basis, the court calculated that the dentist
was subject to liability for damages for a period of 7,169 days. s8 With
the periods of coverage stipulated, the court found that Medical
Protective Company was exposed to liability as the insurer of Dr. Winter
for 5,577 days, or seventy-eight percent of the total; Federal Insurance
Company for 1,155 days, sixteen percent of the total, and plaintiff,
Continental Casualty Company, for 437 days, six percent of the total.8 9
Because the premiums paid by the dentist for insurance coverage were
based primarily upon these periods of time, the proration among the

82. Id.
83. Id. at 791-92.

84. Id. at 792. In that situation, each insurer received a premium to cover the same
loss resulting from the same conduct, and each insurer is responsible for the loss up to its

respective policy limits. Therefore, those policy limits may be properly used as a means
of apportioning the loss fairly. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court noted that the cost of purchasing insurance does not proportionately
increase with the amount of the policy limit, but the time period of minimum coverage is
the principal factor with additional amounts being relatively inexpensive by comparison.
Id. (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 753 F.2d 1288, 1291 (4th
Cir.1985)).
87. Id. Analogizing the facts of the case with those of InsuranceCo. of North Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations,Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), the court decided that the fair
method of apportioning a loss among consecutive insurers is an application of the "exposure
theory" utilized in asbestos cases where a loss results from a series of cumulative acts or
omissions. Id.
88. 859 S.W.2d at 792. The patient was under the care of the dentist from October 25,
1965 until June 11, 1985. Id.
89. Id.
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three insurers on the basis of the proportionate period of each company's
exposure was "the fairest method of allocating the loss.' °
In a recent case, Roman Catholic Diocese of Joliet, Inc. v. Interstate
Fire Insurance Co.,"' involving the disturbing act of pedophilia, the
church reached a settlement in the civil action and thereafter sought
reimbursement from its insurers.' In determining the proper method
of loss apportionment, the court found that the liability resulted from
negligent supervision of the priest who abused the child and from the
church's failure to take remedial action.93 The court stated that
damage can occur because of the continuous nature of the abuse and in
such instances it becomes difficult to determine when the damage to the
victim occurs. 94 With this in mind, the court determined that there
was no way to accurately measure the damage caused by the abuse
during any given policy period; therefore, under its construction of the
contract language, the loss should be apportioned based on the policy
periods.9 The court noted that "if the number of molestations were
known and.., could be proved, [it] could allocate the loss(es) according
However,
to the actual injury suffered during each policy period.'
because this determination was not an available option, the court
apportioned the losses pro rata between all relevant policy periods.9
There were two policy periods triggered, thus the liability was divided
in half and then subject to policy limitations.9 8
Some commentators believe that the "time on the risk" method of
apportionment should be used in all continuous injury cases. 99 This
comment only speaks to settlement of cases where the injuries are not
easily ascertainable. However, the author agrees with many of the
reasons used in promoting this method for other cases as well. For
instance, the time on the risk method furthers one of the main goals
pursued by all parties-to arrive at an administratively manageable

90. Id.

91. 685 N.E.2d 932 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
92. Id. at 934.
93. Id. at 938.
94. Id. at 939 (citing Diocese ofWinona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 841 F. Supp. 894,
898 (D. Minn. 1992)). The court reasoned that finding otherwise could potentially deny
coverage liability. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.

97. Id. The court stated that the losses were attributable according to the percentage
of the time or period of each child's molestation occurring during each policy period. Id.

(citing Diocese of Lafayette v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359 (1990)).
98. Id. at 939-40.
99.

See Michael G. Doherty, Allocating ProgressiveInjury Liability Among Successive

Insurance Policies, 64 U. CH. L. REv. 257 (1997).
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interpretation of insurance policies that can be applied with a minimal
need for expensive litigation.1' ° One commentator suggests:
The time-on-the-risk method should be adopted by courts because its
inherent simplicity promotes predictability, reduces incentives to
litigate, and ultimately reduces premium rates .... Courts can easily
administer the time-on-the-risk method. Once a court determines the
scope of the progressive injury, that is, the total damage and the period
of time from exposure to manifestation, it can readily allocate the
damages among the triggered policies. The court divides the total
damages by the number of triggered years and simply allocates to each
year the result."'1
In a perfect world it would be possible to hold each insurer liable only
for that portion of liability that is allocable to the policy period in
question. This is "theoretically satisfying, but will almost always be
infeasible.""0 2 For all practical purposes, once a settlement is reached
and liability is found for all triggered insurers, the real issue becomes
whether the injury or damage suffered during the different policy
periods is indivisible. If so, the apportionment of the settlement costs
should based on a pro rata by time on the risk method. This allocation
scheme is attractive in many ways, yet it is always important to
"recognize that damages are by their nature fact-dependent and that
trial courts must be given the flexibility to apportion them in a manner
befitting each case." 3 Often that manner will reflect what is best for
the insured.
Assuming that the settlement entered into is what is best for the
insured, the remaining questions regard apportionment among the
insurers liable for the settlement payment. Following equitable
principles of unjust enrichment and basic division of liabilities, the
courts must conclude that each contributing insurer has a right to
reimbursement from any other insurer found responsible as a result of
its policy or policies being triggered. Often because of the very nature
of the injuries, this apportionment method will require an approximate
calculation of the amounts owed. Because of the uncertainty involved,
it appears most equitable to announce that in these specific situations
the courts will conclude that all liable insurers must share in the

100. Forty Eight Insulations,633 F.2d at 1218 (referring to its task of apportionment
as a "Solomonian" possibility).
101. See Doherty, supra note 99, at 281 (defending the time on the risk method).
102. NorthernStates, 523 N.W.2d at 663 (quoting KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF Toxic TORT AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 120 (1991)).
103. Id.
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payment of the settlement according to their respective policy periods
triggered. Use of this method would result in less confusion during the
litigation process. Furthermore, a forewarning that the insurers will
eventually be liable could lead to more efficient resolution of the matters
involved.
IV

CONTRIBUTION AND SUBROGATION

As mentioned earlier, often an insurer or possibly the insured will go
forward with the defense of a continuous injury claim, settle the suit,
and then seek apportionment through the court system. Under the
doctrine of subrogation,'" the settling party may equitably allocate the
loss over all triggered policies. The court will look to the triggers of
coverage to determine the policy periods and thus the insurance
companies responsible for payment of all costs associated with the
litigation. The proper apportionment method will then be used to
determine the amount of liability. The resulting claims will be for
indemnification of any monies owed. If insurers paid more than their
fair share they will seek to subrogate to recover payments from other
liable insurers. When the insurer indemnifies the insured, it then
becomes equitably entitled to recover any "over payment" from the other
carriers. This action derives from the principle that an insurer who
covers its insured's settlement is entitled to recover all or part of that
settlement from another responsible party, based on the latter's
proportion of fault."° In such instances, the insurer is subrogated to
the insured's rights of recovery.
Subrogation of an insured's rights is an equitable remedy which is
derived from rights of and is limited to those rights. 6 Most often the
insured is a plaintiff against a tortfeasor or a nonpaying insurer.
Essentially, the principle of subrogation permits one who is legally
obligated to pay the debt of another to "stand in the shoes" of the person
owed payment and enforce that person's right against the actual
wrongdoer. 7 The insurer will retain part interest in the insured's
claim against the tortfeasor to the extent that the insurer has compensated the insured for his loss or, in our case, overpaid for more than its
pro rata share." s Any contributing insurer may have a cause of action

104. The doctrine of subrogation enables an insurer that has paid all or a portion of an
insured's loss to recoup the payment from any other party responsible for the lose.
105. 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1792 (1982).
106. Curles v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 198 Ga. App. 857, 403 S.E.2d 458
(1991).
107. 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1794 (1982).
108. See Childers v. Eastern Foam Prods., Inc., 94 F.R.D. 53 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
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for equitable subrogation against any noncontributing insurers whose
polices were also triggered. It is universally accepted that an insurer
settling a claim that should have been covered by another insurance
company can recover any amount overpaid in settlement under the
equitable doctrine of subrogation."° Courts have reasoned that equity
allows an insurer that paid a debt owed by another to obtain reimbursement from those who ought to have paid it."' This includes the right
to an action to recover defense expenditures.'
However, courts differ
on the issue of whether the doctrine of subrogation also applies to
settlement and defense costs where two or more insurance companies
were equally obligated to defend.
Whether an insurer can compel contribution from a coinsurer who is
equally obligated to defend is a question that has resulted in a split of
authority.112 Some jurisdictions have held that because the duty to
defend is personal to each insurer, the obligation is several, and where
many carriers are obligated to defend, each separate carrier is neither
entitled to divide the duty nor to require contribution from another,
absent a specific contractual right."3 The trend in other jurisdictions
has been to allow an insurer, under the doctrines of contribution or
equitable subrogation, to recover costs of defense from other insurers
who were equally obligated to defend yet failed to do so."" One court
reasoned that an insurer should not be encouraged to avoid its responsibility to provide a defense for its insured, nor should that insurer be
rewarded for breaching its duty under its insurance contract."'

109. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Natl Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983,
985-87 (Utah 1996).
110. Id. at 985.
111. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 377 P.2d 786,
787-88 (Utah 1963) (holding that insurer who had successfully defended an insured which
should have been covered and thus defended by another insurance company could recover
the costs and attorney fees under the doctrine of subrogation).
112. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997).
113. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579, 582 (10th
Cir. 1960).
114. National Indem. Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 724 P.2d 544, 545 (Ariz. 1986).
Under the principle of equitable subrogation, the insurer which has performed the
duty to provide a defense to its insured should be able to compel contribution for
a share of the cost of defense from another insurer who had a similar obligation
to the same insured but failed to perform it.
115. Id. In agreement with this approach, one scholar comments:
These holdings are indefensible. The courts are ignoring realities and encouraging
insurers who are not concerned with their obligations to their insures in the hope
that someone else will step into the breach .... Further, as a matter of public
policy, courts should be demanding that insurers give prompt defense of claims to
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This comment agrees with those jurisdictions that have allowed
contribution where one insurer has paid more than its fair share of the
defense costs. Where it can be shown that a co-insurer failed to defend
or failed to pay its share of the defense expenses, that insurer should not
be rewarded and payment excused when another co-insurer has taken
upon itself the provision of that defense. Holding otherwise would not
only lead to an inequitable result but may also conflict with the public
policy of encouraging prompt payments to the insured, leaving disputes
concerning coverage to be determined later." In addition, an insurer
does not lose its right to equitable subrogation because it failed to take
timely action to protect its rights. An insurer may wait until it has paid
in full before instigating an action to compel reimburseits insured
17
ment.
It should be noted that the settlement of a nondefending and
noncontributing insurer with the primary insured does not extinguish
any rights owed by that insurer to the defending insurers. Admittedly,
under the law of most states, "any defenses that are valid against the
insured are also valid against the [subrogated] insurer."118 However,
even though the insured settled and released all claims against a prior
non-contributing insurer, that release does not act as a complete defense
against a defending insurer's claims." 9 This eliminates the ability of
a noncontributing insurer to "lock in" its amount of liability or responsibility for a settlement.
Similarly, in third-party insurance contexts, courts have held that
where the insured settles with a tortfeasor, and the tortfeasor and/or its
insurer was on notice of the other insurer's subrogation right, then the
settlement and release will not affect the insurer's right of subrogation."2 The overwhelming majority of states allow a subsequent

policyholders rather than to tolerate the shifting of responsibility with such
impunity.
J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4691, at 278 (Walter F.
Berdal ed. 1979). See also Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 366 P.2d 455, 461 (Cal.
1961).
116. State Farm, 912 P.2d at 987.
117. Id. at 985-87.
118. Fashion Place Inv., Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County Mental Health, 776
P.2d 941, 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
119. Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at 138.
120. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029, 1031
(Utah 1995) ("[A] settlement between an injured party and a tort-feasor who has knowledge
of the subrogation rights of the injured party's insurer does not destroy the subrogation
claim of the injured party's insurer."); see also Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d
783, 787 (Utah 1972).
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equitable subrogation action by an insurer if the insurer did not consent
to the release and the tortfeasor knew of the insurer's interest prior to
the release."'
These authorities reason that allowing a general
release between the tortfeasor and the insured "'constitutes a trap for
the unwary insured plaintiff'" and "'encourages fraud or, at the very
least, sharp practice on the part of the tortfeasor or his insurance
carrier.' "122
' Ultimately, these courts find that to require the unsophisticated insured to execute a release of all claims, even though the
tortfeasor has knowledge of the insurer's interest and the probable
existence of a standard insurance policy provision obligating the insured
to protect the insurer's subrogation rights, is simply not consistent with
fair dealing and ought not be encouraged."2 This rationale was
affirmed when the Washington Supreme Court stated that although
equities also favored encouraging settlements and avoiding litigation,
"such a speculative result is not equitably purchased at the price of
either abandoning the subrogation rights of the insurer or limiting
recovery to reimbursement from the injured insured. " "24
This same reasoning is equally applicable to consecutive insurers
where one insurer is on notice that another has paid all or more than its
share of the defense costs." "Indeed, there is probably even more of
an incentive for an insurer to engage in 'sharp practices' to settle for a
limited amount with the possibly unsophisticated insured to avoid the
subrogation rights of another insurer who has paid substantial defense
costs.""
"[Ilt is more equitable to hold that an insurer who is on
notice that another insurer has been paying significant defense costs
should not be allowed to settle for a minimal sum to avoid having to
contribute its fair share."2 7
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the case of a settlement of a continuous injury claim, where there
is coverage under multiple policies and one insurer pays more than its
fair share, courts have asserted that such an insurer is entitled to

121. 16 MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 61:201 (rev. ed. 1983). This
approach is also supported by a majority of other jurisdictions. See Farmers Ins. Group
of Cos. v. Martinez, 752 P.2d 797, 799 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); Leader Nat Ins. Co. v. Torres,
779 P.2d 722, 724 (Wash. 1989) (Torres II).
122. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Torres, 751 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1988) (Torres I) (quoting
Home Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 375 N.E.2d 115, 117 (fI1. 2d 1978)).
123. Id. at 1254-55.
124. Torres 11, 779 P.2d at 725.
125. Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at 139.
126. Id.
127. Id
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contribution from the other liable carriers. The liability, and therefore
the responsible parties, is determined by applying the trigger of coverage
theories to the policy periods in which exposure to injury-causing
conditions existed. Courts have often applied pure equitable principles
to assert that the right of contribution arises out of an equitable doctrine
that one who pays money for the benefit of another is entitled to
reimbursement. The case law supports the equitable distribution of the
loss among the affected insurers. Normally, the insurer's indemnification will be dispersed to the paying insurance companies according to
one of the proper apportionment methods.
When the injury is indivisible between all triggered policies, the best
method of apportioning the triggered insurer's payments into the
settlement of a continuous injury claim is the pro rata time on the risk
method. This method is based on the equitable contribution arising out
of what is in essence a subrogation to part of the insured's right to
indemnification as well as prorata apportionment of the cost by way of
the time on the risk for each policy period triggered. First, actual
triggered policies must be determined by using the continuous trigger
theory of defining an occurrence. All policies covering the insured from
the exposure until manifestation of the injury are triggered. The
number of policy periods to which each insurer provided coverage will be
proportionally related to the aggregate number of policy periods
triggered. Each insurer is then left with a corresponding percentage of
the entire cost of defense and settlement. This amount is then compared
individually by way of the deductibles and policy limits to determine the
grand total of the insurer's liability payment. If any of the insurers
whose policies were triggered failed to participate in the defense or
settlement payments, then all contributing insurers have an equitable
right to receive contribution payments from those delinquent insurers by
way of subrogation to the rights of the insured.
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